Discussion

The impact of COVID-19 on adult social care has been severe. The death toll in care homes and domiciliary care is significant, and people working in social care have been at greater risk of dying from COVID-19 than other adults. Many of those who use social care services face higher risks from COVID-19 because of their age, pre-existing health conditions and given that many live close together in residential and nursing home settings. England is not alone here: most countries have experienced challenges in managing and preventing outbreaks in long-term care settings. But could the scale of the crisis in social care have been reduced?

Based on our analysis of the national policy response in England, the Health Secretary’s claim that the government has ‘tried to throw a protective ring’ around care homes since the start of the pandemic does not appear to be grounded in reality. We identify five lessons from our analysis of national government policy on social care in first phase of the pandemic.

1 Policy action was too slow

Government support for social care services was slow to arrive. Several policies targeted social care in March, including emergency funding in the budget and guidance for social care providers. But the government’s COVID-19 social care action plan was not published until 15 April. This was almost a month after country-wide social distancing measures had been introduced, nearly 2 weeks after the NHS had constructed and opened its first Nightingale hospital, and the same week that the number of excess deaths in care homes peaked. Another month was to elapse before the introduction of the infection control fund for social care. Government launched a national social care recruitment campaign on 24 April, with the aim of bolstering the workforce with 20,000 new staff. Yet the recruitment drive to get retired doctors and nurses back into the NHS to support the COVID-19 response had begun on 19 March – and 750,000 volunteers had already been recruited to support the NHS by early April. There has also been a delay between policies being announced and implemented in some key areas. Overall, government support for social care services came too late.

2 The NHS was prioritised

Protecting the NHS has been a consistent government objective throughout the pandemic so far. The NHS was promised ‘whatever it needs, whatever it costs’ to deal with COVID-19. It responded fast with widespread changes to services and block purchasing of private sector capacity. This focus on ensuring sufficient acute hospital capacity made sense – particularly in the early stages of the crisis, when reports were emerging from Italy of hospitals being overwhelmed with COVID-19 cases, and given the NHS entered the crisis with fewer doctors and nurses, and less equipment per capita than most comparable countries. But protecting and strengthening social care services appears to have been given far lower priority by national policymakers – with slow access to PPE and testing, and less certainty for councils about funding. Data about deaths in care settings were not available in the early weeks of the crisis, and social care leaders were absent in daily press briefings until 8 June.

Ultimately, health and social care services interact in a complex system. The overriding priority given to protecting the NHS in the early stages of the pandemic may help to explain why the potential unintended consequences of rapidly discharging patients from hospitals to care homes – without testing for COVID-19 – appear not to have been fully foreseen. Decisions to discharge patients were made by clinical teams in good faith and in an unknown and urgent context. And leaving medically stable care home residents in hospitals would have carried other risks. But the national push to free up space in hospitals may have played a role in transferring risk to a poorly prepared social care system lacking the right protection.

3 Narrow focus on care homes

The adult social care system delivers a wide range of services to adults of all ages. Around 842,000 adults received long-term support from local authorities in England in 2018–19. While debates about social care often focus on older people, 35% of those receiving care are aged 18–64. Social care is delivered in a mix of settings – including care homes, supported living and extra care housing, people’s private homes, and elsewhere in the community.

While there has been a growing focus in the media on deaths in care homes during the pandemic, there has also been a significant increase in deaths among people receiving care in their own homes. National policies on social care during the pandemic so far have focused primarily on care homes – not the wider social care system. Policies on testing are one example of this. A government announcement on 28 April stated that testing would now be expanded to all asymptomatic NHS and social care staff, but the testing expansion in social care only covered staff in care homes. And personal care assistants and unpaid carers were not added to the list of essential workers until the beginning of May. Whole care home testing was initially implemented for care homes for people aged 65 and older. The risk is that government protection and support has not reached all parts of the social care system.

4 Unmet need and unintended consequences

Temporary powers to relax the Care Act and widespread pressures on services are likely to create unmet need and have potential unintended consequences. Even before COVID-19, unmet need for social care among both younger and older adults was high., While data on unmet need are limited, the pandemic appears to have made this worse: almost a quarter of council leaders surveyed by ADASS reported that unmet need for social care in their area could have increased by around 1–5% during the outbreak so far. Data on hospital admissions among care home residents also suggest that there may be unmet need for health care services as a result of the pandemic.

Emergency measures to relax the Care Act have been implemented in a small number of local authorities – meaning that assessments of care needs do not need to take place and, in the most severe cases, councils only need to meet a person’s needs if not doing so will breach their human rights. These decisions to delay or reduce social care for some groups are a product of constrained resources and challenges delivering care safely, but will inevitably store up problems for the future. There may also be unintended consequences of the government’s decision to allow local councils to provide ‘free’ social care services for people during the pandemic but charge for these services retrospectively – including unplanned financial strain on people and families, and reduced trust in services.

5 A backdrop of political neglect

No policy action on social care during COVID-19 could undo the effects of decades of political neglect. As we have outlined, the social care system that entered the pandemic was underfunded, understaffed, undervalued, and at risk of collapse. Cuts in social care have been one part of wider cuts to local government budgets, including for public health. This was no secret: adult social care services in England are widely thought to be inadequate and unsustainable. Publicly funded care is only available to people with the highest needs and lowest means. Despite this, successive governments have avoided fundamental reform of the system.

Any response to COVID-19 – however fast or comprehensive – would have needed to contend with this legacy of political neglect. The failure of successive governments to reform social care is being laid bare. While the Prime Minister has restated the government’s commitment to reforming social care as the country emerges from the first peak of the virus, history tells us that we should see it before we believe it. And the Prime Minister’s framing of ‘the problem’ in social care – the unfairness of some people having to sell their homes to pay for care – suggests a very narrow interpretation of the issues to be addressed.

Policy priorities

At the daily briefing on 3 May, Michael Gove, Minister for the Cabinet Office, said ‘undoubtedly, this government, like all governments, will have made mistakes’. It will be for a future inquiry to make judgements on these mistakes and how they could have been avoided. In the short term, the priority for government must be to identify lessons from the first stage of the pandemic to help prepare for potential future waves of COVID-19. Our analysis of the policy response on social care points to several immediate priorities.

In next phase of the COVID-19 response, national government leaders should:

  • Give the same political priority to protecting social care services as hospitals and the NHS.
  • Include the social care sector as equal partners in planning and decision making. At a national level, the new social care sector COVID-19 support taskforce offers one route to do this. Greater involvement of social care expertise and experience, including in areas such as learning disabilities and autism, will improve national decision making.
  • Ensure that national policies, including those related to the NHS, encourage the meaningful involvement of social care in local planning and decision-making processes – including sustainability and transformation partnerships and integrated care systems.
  • Give equal recognition to the value of NHS and social care staff and reflect this in any new support schemes and the policy narrative used to describe them.
  • Continue to improve the availability of regular testing and PPE for the social care sector, and ensure access to the training and other support needed to reduce infection risks.
  • Commit to providing the necessary funding to cover additional COVID-19 costs incurred by local government and care providers, such as extra staffing and PPE costs.
  • Recognise the interdependency of health and social care in COVID-19 policies and guidance. Identify gaps in services that need to be addressed and ensure that care homes can access enhanced support from primary and community health services. This includes the national implementation of the NHS enhanced health care in care homes service.
  • Ensure that plans to manage and prevent further outbreaks take into account the diversity of social care services and the varied requirements of staff and users in different settings – including in domiciliary care, other settings outside care homes, and for unpaid carers.
  • Work to improve the quality, accuracy, and timeliness of data in adult social care to inform local and national decision making. This should include a minimum dataset for care homes and improved availability of data on other services. Plans to improve social care data should be included in the government’s forthcoming National Data Strategy.

More fundamental reform of the social care system is also needed to address the longstanding policy failures exposed by COVID-19. Priorities for government include:

  • Stabilising and sustaining the social care system so that it can better meet people’s needs. This should include policy action and investment to improve staff pay and conditions.
  • Increasing access to publicly funded social care services to help address unmet need.
  • Reforming the social care funding system to provide greater government protection for individuals against social care costs. One model to do this – a cap on lifetime care costs – already lies on the statute book. This could be used flexibly by government depending on choices about the balance of responsibility between individuals and the state.

Comprehensive reform of the social care system will require additional government investment. But reform is not unaffordable. If it chooses to, government can afford to provide more generous care and support for vulnerable people in society. If it does not, government will be choosing to prolong one of the biggest policy failures of our generation.

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