Designing spread programmes

The analysis in previous chapters suggests that adopting a complex intervention is hard work, and that adopters play a very significant role in translating an intervention into a new setting successfully. In this chapter, we look at two consequences for the design of spread programmes: the need to build adopters’ commitment to implementing a new idea and the need to support them in doing so.

Building adopter commitment

The significant role adopters play in adapting complex interventions suggests that attempts to replicate interventions at scale will be more likely to succeed if they recognise and respect the centrality of adopters’ agency in this process. Most obviously, it matters that adopters want to implement a new idea and are committed to doing so, particularly with complex interventions that may necessitate behaviour change from those involved. Nevertheless, this point is often overlooked within national programmes (particularly in the public sector, where providers can be subject to central direction), which tend to focus on the supply of new ideas to the health care system rather than on generating a desire among potential adopters to adopt them.

Specifically, building a commitment to implementing a new idea requires both: (i) acceptance of the problem and the proposed solution (that is, a willingness to implement it in principle);, and (ii) the motivation to put the solution into practice.

How best to gain acceptance and generate motivation therefore become crucial matters for programme design. Achieving consensus on the problem and the proposed solution will usually require engaging adopters in what is being proposed, and may well benefit from giving them the chance to input into or co-design the solution. Similarly, ensuring that adopters are motivated and remain so over time may also require engaging them in shaping the solution and giving them the autonomy to take ownership of it.

These issues are crystallised most starkly when programmes are mandatory or have a strong element of top-down pressure – for while mandating participation might ensure that organisations join a programme, it does not by itself achieve acceptance of a new intervention or the motivation to implement it. But these issues remain a challenge even when participation in a programme is voluntary. A review of evaluations of Health Foundation improvement programmes between 2003 and 2011 concluded that ‘improvement interventions are often “essentially contested”: everyone may agree on the need for good quality, but not on what defines quality or how it should be achieved’. Failure to achieve consensus can hinder uptake and effective implementation, as Box 10 illustrates.

Box 10: Valuing the adopter’s perspective

The Health Foundation’s Safer Clinical Systems programme (2008–2016) sought to improve patient safety by developing the capacity of teams to diagnose system-level weaknesses and introduce interventions to address them. A prominent feature of the programme was its goal of changing the way organisations approached safety from the prevailing reactive, incident-based approach to a more proactive, risk-based one.

One hospital-based team targeted the problem of unplanned readmissions from care homes. The team saw the underlying causes as poor communication between the hospital and the care homes, and inadequate community-based support. Several interventions were introduced to address these problems, including a community geriatric team, a 24-hour telephone support service and an information form to accompany transferred patients. Yet the care home workers believed a more important issue was that patients were sometimes being discharged when it was neither appropriate nor safe to do so – for example, at weekends without the necessary medication or equipment. As a result, they didn’t fully accept that the interventions introduced were the optimal ones for addressing the problem, and resultant tensions in the goals and priorities of the hospital team and care home teams ended up frustrating the improvement work.

This case illustrates the importance of considering the adopter’s perspective from the outset. According to the evaluators, in this case the care homes held valuable insights into the nature of the problem, which could have led to the development of better interventions had they been taken into account earlier.

Considering the adopter’s perspective seems especially crucial when working across organisational boundaries. A recent evaluation by the Improvement Analytics Unit (a partnership between NHS England and the Health Foundation) of providing enhanced support for older people in care homes in Rushcliffe found that residents experienced reduced A&E attendances and admissions compared to a matched comparison group. The evaluation notes that the providers involved had a programme of work specifically to build relationships across organisational boundaries and engage care home teams and that ‘It is possible that this has led to greater common understanding of the nature of the problems that need to be addressed and, therefore, more effective interventions’.

Generating acceptance of the need for change and the motivation to change can require far more than the presentation of evidence. Behavioural science suggests these phenomena have strong psychological and social dynamics – being influenced by attitudes, norms and relationships. Box 11 describes three important areas where behavioural insights can inform the design of spread programmes in this respect: peer leadership, peer communities and adopter ownership.

Box 11: Behavioural insights and spread

When it comes to adopting new ideas, behavioural science suggests that steps such as accepting the need for change and then moving from intentions to actual behavioural change have important psychological and social dimensions. Here we look at three such issues that relate to specific aspects of the design of spread programmes.

Peer leadership. The source of any change message is a crucial factor in building the case for change. Evidence shows people are more likely to listen to and be influenced by others like them – whether in terms of identity, background or behaviours – particularly when the topic is related to the group identity of the ‘messenger’ and ‘receiver’. (This can sometimes be a rational strategy as it means the messenger may be more likely to understand the specific issues faced by the receiver.)

This phenomenon can be particularly significant in health care, given the demarcation of professional identities and the strong role that professional bodies tend to play in determining values and behaviour. For this reason, professional and peer leadership can be especially important in building a case for change and developing consensus around a solution. As a recent Health Foundation report put it: ‘Active work to secure credibility is needed. This is likely to imply working with a variety of professional groups on their own terms, and aligning the project with each group’s values and notions of best practice’.

Peer communities. Social networks can play an important role in generating a commitment to change as they not only transmit information but also shape norms and values, which can be powerful drivers of behaviour and of the adoption of new ideas. Thus, creating a peer community or network of adopters can play an important role in generating and maintaining a collective commitment to change (as well as in supporting the kind of peer-to-peer learning discussed in the previous chapter).

Studies suggest that adoption is influenced by network strength, which is determined by factors such as frequency of contact, geographical proximity and degree of intimacy between the ‘champion’ and the adopter. For example, one study found that primary care practices were more likely to be early adopters of a new drug if neighbouring practices had already done so. Spread programmes could therefore benefit from fostering the kinds of horizontal structures that are commonly used in wider quality improvement work, such as clinical communities and improvement collaboratives.,

Ownership of the intervention. The degree of ownership of an intervention among adopters – reflecting their role in helping to create and shape it – may also be important for building and sustaining commitment. This goes beyond the need to adapt an intervention simply in order to make it work in a new context; research suggests that the very act of creating something can be important in generating attachment to it. This has been named the ‘IKEA effect’, based on the observation that people value products they have made themselves more highly than identical, externally-assembled versions.

A range of psychological mechanisms may underlie this phenomenon, including the increase in attachment that can occur with effort, the positive feelings of efficacy that accompany the successful completion of tasks, and potentially also the inherent enjoyment of the creative task itself. Norton et al. suggest that these psychological mechanisms also apply to organisational change and may contribute to the so-called ‘not invented here’ syndrome, whereby organisations reject good ideas developed elsewhere in favour of their own internally developed ideas. They also suggest that these psychological mechanisms may not be susceptible to influence. In any case, this highlights the utility adopters gain from being involved in the process of creating and shaping an intervention, and thus the potential advantages of allowing appropriate autonomy and ownership of the intervention for helping to generate a commitment to implementing and sustaining it.

The innovators from the Health Foundation’s programmes who took part in our survey clearly recognised the need for adopter autonomy and ownership. When asked whether innovator control or adopter autonomy should be prioritised in supporting spread, the vast majority of innovators (86%) chose the statement ‘It is better for the innovator to allow adopter autonomy to encourage local ownership’, with only one in seven (14%) choosing ‘It is better for the innovator/programme leader to try to control adopter implementation in order to ensure fidelity’.

Figure 12: Survey of innovators – control versus autonomy

That factors such as peer leadership, peer communities and adopter ownership matter is also clear from a history of programmes that have underperformed because they didn’t pay enough attention to getting buy-in from everyone concerned or creating a community of adopters to support the spread process. One such example, the Matching Michigan programme, is described in Box 12.

Box 12: Matching Michigan

Recent research by Dixon-Woods and colleagues, supported by the Health Foundation, looked at the differing fortunes of two programmes to reduce central venous catheter bloodstream infections (CVC-BSIs)., One was the Michigan Keystone programme (2003–2006), which successfully reduced CVC-BSIs in intensive care units (ICUs) across Michigan. The other was an NHS programme in England called ‘Matching Michigan’ (2009–2011), which sought to reproduce the success of the Keystone programme, but failed to have an impact over and above the contemporary background trend.

One key difference between the programmes was professional leadership. The Michigan programme was voluntary and led by a state hospital association and a university. They deployed ICU ‘insiders’ to promote the programme, with whom participants could identify. The researchers found that this was essential for establishing trust, securing legitimacy and influencing professional norms: ‘the credibility and legitimacy of the evidence and the proposed action had to be established through social processes…The authority of evidence does not stand on its own but requires support from the moral authority of those seeking to deploy it’. By contrast, the Matching Michigan programme in England was led by a government agency and followed a series of other initiatives to tackle CVC-BSIs that had been perceived by some as ‘top-down’ and punitive. This undermined engagement and made it difficult to persuade participants that the programme was necessary. According to the researchers, ‘The location of the programme in a government agency rather than a professional organisation or research collaboration appeared to contribute to an alienating sense of distance on the part of some front-line clinicians. Matching Michigan was seen as imposed from the outside and lacking in professional ownership’. The researchers concluded that these differences profoundly affected the English programme’s prospects, since there were difficulties in persuading people of the problem (infection rates were in fact much lower in England at the start of the programme than they had been in Michigan) and also that the programme was the solution (best practices were already being adopted, and the programme evaluation showed a strong secular trend towards improvement).

Horizontal relationships were another key mechanism underpinning the Michigan programme’s success. By bringing participants together in workshops, the programme built a networked community, which helped create shared norms and generate commitment and ownership among participating teams. That is not to say there were no top-down elements to the programme; there was a vertical structure that provided leadership and coordination and made judicious use of top-down pressures, such as the deployment of data for benchmarking. But the researchers found that these vertical forces were balanced by strong horizontal ones: ‘By developing horizontal links between the participating units, the programme was able to mobilize social forces beyond what would have been possible had the model been solely vertical’. The English programme, by contrast, did not invest in creating such horizontal links. This meant that participating units lacked the experience of being part of a collaborative community working together towards shared goals, which in turn reduced the possibility for influencing professional norms. Furthermore, because the English programme was mandatory, it inspired varying levels of commitment and ownership: ‘Whereas Michigan generated emotional commitment, ICU staff in England did not feel the same affection, identification and ownership for the programme’.

Supporting adopters to implement new ideas

In addition to adopter commitment, successful spread will also clearly rely on adopters’ ability to implement the intervention in question, that is, on their readiness and capability to do so, as well as on them having sufficient opportunity to do so. So adoption may require time, resources and organisational capacity.

While this may seem obvious, it is worth emphasising because spread programmes have often been designed without considering these factors. For example, in programmes that seek to pilot and then ‘roll out’ interventions, there can be an assumption that once an intervention has been successfully piloted, the hard work has been done and spreading the intervention will be straightforward. This can also be accompanied by an assumption that adoption can happen quickly, even though the innovator may have taken years to develop and refine the intervention within their own organisation. To take an example, a recent Health Foundation study of progress made by the New Care Models vanguard sites in England found that work had already been going on in these sites for between two and ten years before the New Care Models programme started.

But as we have seen, adopting a complex intervention may itself necessitate substantial creative effort and reinvention. In some cases, it could take as long as the initial development of the intervention, perhaps even longer if there needs to be an initial period in which the adopter site has to develop the readiness and capability to implement the intervention that the innovator site had already possessed at the outset of their work.

These traditional assumptions about innovation and spread are also often reflected in the distribution of resources within spread programmes, which tend to focus funding on demonstration projects – pilots, ‘vanguards’, ‘pioneers’, and so on – and then expect everyone else to follow with little, if any, financial or organisational support. Again, the experience of the recent New Care Models programme is instructive. The National Audit Office report on the programme found that NHS England provided a total of £329m to the 50 New Care Models vanguards for testing their proposed new care models, along with a further £60m to accelerate implementation and maximise opportunities for replicating them. But it also highlighted that, despite an ambition that 50% of the population would be covered by these new care models by 2020–2021, details of how the new models were to be spread were not set out, and further resources that might have supported spread were instead reallocated to reducing trusts’ financial deficits.

The logic of the discussion here, however, is that resources may instead need to be invested in building adopters’ readiness and capability and allowing them to have sufficient time and space to do the hard work of translating the intervention into their own context.

All of this has consequences for how spread programmes are designed. Most obviously, programmes may need to include support for implementation. This could involve funding to help an adopter site create the necessary capacity (for example, to establish project-management teams or backfill staff positions) or to support the upfront costs of adoption (for example, for initial ‘double running’ costs). It could also include embedded support in areas like analytics and evaluation, or mechanisms to support peer-to-peer or organisation-to-organisation learning.

Successful adoption may also require a decent chunk of time and ‘headspace’. This includes building in sufficient time for adopters’ journeys to a state of readiness and allowing for a proper set-up phase prior to implementation. While ambitious timetables can help to motivate faster implementation, it can be counterproductive to impose unrealistic timescales for change, which can divert attention towards finding quick wins and away from the hard work of diagnosing underlying problems and designing necessary changes.

Our survey of innovators and adopters provides some useful data on these issues.When innovators were asked which changes, with hindsight, would have made the biggest difference for helping adopters to implement the intervention, the option of providing more training and support to build adopter skills and capabilities ranked highly among the options given (chosen by 48% of innovators), second only to doing more in advance to support adopter readiness (57%).

Figure 13: Survey of innovators – what would have helped most?

These priorities were also reflected in adopters’ responses to the same question. For adopters, the most popular option was greater opportunities to share learning and experiences with one another (chosen by 41% of adopters), with supporting adopter readiness ranked second (31%) and providing more training and support ranked equal third (26%), along with providing more time for implementation.

Figure 14: Survey of adopters – what would have helped most?

In summary, spread programmes should aim to build and maintain adopters’ commitment, including seeking consensus on the problem being tackled and the proposed solution, as well as allowing appropriate autonomy and encouraging adopter ownership of the intervention. Spread programmes also need to provide adopters with sufficient support for implementation, and this may have implications for the balance of investment between supporting innovators and adopters.

Case study 3

Situational Awareness for Everyone (SAFE): How adopter communities can help drive spread and create a determination to succeed

Certain outcomes for acutely sick children in the UK are significantly worse than in other countries. The causes are complex, but include frequent failure to recognise severity of illness, inappropriate response to deterioration and poor communication.

Originally developed in the military, ‘situational awareness’ has recently gained interest within health care. It seeks to support the anticipation of potential problems through improved consciousness of, and attentiveness to, the environment. Huddles – rapid exchanges of key information among the staff involved in a patient’s care – are one way to operationalise situational awareness. They typically last between five and ten minutes, involve staff from different professional groups, and follow a set of scripted questions. By encouraging information sharing, they help health care workers spot when a patient’s condition is deteriorating. Studies have shown that huddles can improve patient safety, enhance collective awareness of harm, improve collegiality among teams and increase clinical accountability.

In 2012, a team at Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children (GOSH) piloted huddles based on a version of this idea developed at Cincinnati Children’s Hospital in 2008, where staff had reported that the huddles played a significant role in highlighting safety problems and identifying clinical deterioration. Following this, from 2014 to 2017, as part of the Health Foundation’s programme Closing the Gap in Patient Safety, the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health (RCPCH) worked with the GOSH team to support the implementation of huddles in paediatric units across 12 hospitals in England, divided into two waves of six.

The SAFE programme approached the implementation of huddles more flexibly than in Cincinnati, using PDSA cycles to guide the form the huddle should take to deliver the best results locally. Accordingly, the intervention was loosely defined at the outset and the programme featured a strong element of testing. Knowing it was going to be implemented in a range of contexts, the programme leaders set out the principles underpinning the intervention and provided resources to aid implementation, such as the SBAR (Situation, Background, Assessment, Recommendation) communication tool.

‘… There are many different ways you can apply the principles to create huddles.’ Interview with the programme leader

‘Well, I think particularly with the DGHs [district general hospitals], it was hard for them, because they didn’t have anything to really model it on. I mean, when we started it, there wasn’t anybody else doing it, so we didn’t feel like we had to do it in an absolute, particular way.’

Interview with an implementation site lead

The programme leaders did not prescribe how teams should implement huddles; teams were sent articles based on Cincinnati’s experience, but there was no handbook and no protocol for documenting the huddle. The main way in which teams learned about the intervention was at the initial programme learning events, with a presentation from the programme leader on elements such as the questions to ask in a huddle.

These learning events subsequently became a valuable opportunity for teams to exchange ideas, insights and experiences. Teams would share what they were doing and what new things they had tried. Through the events, the programme leaders created a strong network of adopter sites with the dynamic of a ‘community of practice’.

There were differing fortunes among the initial wave of sites – some did well, while others struggled – but valuable learning emerged from all sites. For example, the programme leaders gained insights into how the intervention could be implemented in a district general hospital, given that it had previously been used only in a tertiary setting.

‘Certainly the idea was that the first 12 sites would sort of try different things, try things out and you’d learn what the errors were and what the pitfalls were so that they could take it to the other teams… what they took to the wave two and three teams was things that had come up that looked like they could be used in lots of different areas, and not just in a tertiary hospital, because I think that was the concern… how is it going to sit with the DGH? But it was good how it was six children’s hospitals and then six DGHs, so you could see how some things worked better in one area compared to another.’ Interview with an implementation site lead

Several adopter sites started to adapt the huddle to suit their own context, and in ways not originally envisaged by the programme leaders. For instance, one site created what it called a ‘druggle’ – a huddle on a neonatal ward focused on medication errors, with representation from the pharmacy team; another site developed hospital-wide situational awareness rounds, where the bed manager collected information about patients’ conditions, staffing levels and bed occupancy rates in order to find the most appropriate wards for new admissions. These kinds of adaptations illustrated the extent to which the intervention could be successfully modified while still retaining fidelity to the key underpinning principle – to support the rapid and effective communication of information across multiple professional groups. The initial phase also demonstrated a number of benefits of the huddle that went beyond identifying patients at risk, including improving team working, role-modelling appropriate behaviours, and breaking down professional barriers.

‘… Just bringing the team together, just somehow physically bringing them together, once a day, even just for three minutes, did improve team working, in a way that we hadn’t expected it would. So, it sort of broke down all these barriers of doctors and nurses, and we’re just one team looking after the patient. It was very powerful… There was a huge amount of role modelling.’ Interview with an implementation site lead

The experiences of adopter sites and insights from the programme evaluation shed light on the elements that seem to be core to the intervention – it has to be multidisciplinary, last no more than 10 minutes, each site needs to use their own huddle script consistently, and the huddles require a ‘champion’ – as well as those that are peripheral.,

‘I don’t think it matters what time it’s done. I don’t think it matters really where it’s done, as long as you’ve got the patient list in front of you. I don’t think it matters what you call it… as long as you know it’s a safety briefing.’ Interview with an implementation site lead

‘… It takes a champion… somebody who is there to make sure everyone else is on board and that it’s on track and that they’re invested and they think it’s important.’ Interview with the programme evaluator

The learning from this period of testing has generated a number of resources to support wider implementation of huddles; for example, a number of teams developed huddle scripts during the programme.,,,

‘I think they got much clearer on the model through that initial process and in a sense were looking for those first 12 sites to help them shape what the model was… I think the first sites were very much the pioneers and they sort of galvanised the approach and, yes, then it was a case of rolling it out as a more clearly articulated programme.’ Interview with the programme evaluator

Over time, the community of adopters has grown. During the course of the programme, significant interest was generated among further prospective sites by local and national media coverage and through events and dissemination activities coordinated by the RCPCH. This led to 16 more sites joining as part of a third wave. According to the evaluator, the first- and second-wave sites were perceived by those not yet participating as pioneers of something that was exciting and offered real benefits.

‘I think there was something about perceiving this group of 12 to be in the sort of inner sanctum, trying this new, exciting thing that had real face validity… there was a combination of it being a sort of elusive thing that they [the third wave sites] weren’t involved in yet and also, yes, the passion and just the common sense of it really, I think.’ Interview with the programme evaluator

This meant that when the third wave of sites came on board there was an air of healthy competition; they were not only able to hit the ground running, benefitting from the experience of the first- and second-wave sites, but also had a real determination to succeed.

‘… They were much more enthused and determined to… get everything embedded quicker and they put that down to various things, I recall. I think [it] was this idea of being the ones that didn’t get it in the first place. There was almost an air of competition or just wanting to prove that they could do it well, and where other people were already out there doing it, and they wanted to get up to speed.’ Interview with the programme evaluator

As interest in the programme grows, a fourth wave is now beginning. This will see the 28 implementation sites from the first three waves ‘buddy’ with a neighbouring organisation to support them in introducing huddles. A total of 50 sites have now completed the programme.

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